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1.  Introduction:  Globalization and Ethics 
  Over the past 20 years, a widespread perception has emerged that a new stage has been 
reached in the relationship between capitalism and the nation-state.  Globalization is the umbrella 
term—indeed the ubiquitous buzzword—conveying a sense the sense that a fundamental 
transformation is occurring in the contemporary world economy.  Governments and opposition 
political parties around the world rewrite their economic programs to take account of the 
perceived new realities engendered by globalization.   Books, articles (including this one) and 
editorial pronouncements all pour forth. 
  A great deal is obviously at stake in these discussions.  At the same time, whether or not 
we have entered a new stage of capitalism, the fundamental ethical standards by which we 
evaluate the merits of capitalist societies remain the same.  These ethical standards are liberty and 
fairness.  Efficiency is the other basic measure by which we judge the performance of capitalist 
economies.  But certainly in ethical terms, the claims for efficiency must carry less weight than 
those for liberty and fairness. 
  There is no question that free-market economic capitalism—what Adam Smith termed 
the “system of perfect liberty”—creates effective material incentives within a competitive 
environment, and thereby can succeed in encouraging discipline and innovation.  But this same 
free-market “system of perfect liberty” also produces deep and chronic problems of unfairness.  
This becomes blindingly clear through even observing casually the the degree of income and 
wealth inequality in societies that more closely approximate the free-market ideal, such as the 
United States.  The most objectionable feature of inequality in these societies is that it is 
necessarily transmitted through generations, since inequalities of outcomes in one generation 
produces inequalities of opportunities for the succeeding generation.  Inequality also produces 
inefficiency, by distorting the incentives of both the over- and under-privileged and discouraging 
cooperative solutions to collective problems.  Intelligently applied egalitarian government 
interventions in market economies can therefore increase both a society’s commitment to fairness   2
and its ability to produce useful goods and services.  These interventions can also be achieved 
with relatively small losses of liberty.    
  Has globalization reduced the ability of countries to implement egalitarian policies 
effectively?  Certainly this view is widespread.  We know that, concurrent with at least the 
widely-shared perceptions of increased global integration, various manifestations of rising 
inequality have arisen in both the United States and the European OECD economies.  These are 
the persistence of high unemployment in Europe and the rise of both earnings and wealth 
differentials in the United States, even while unemployment has fallen to its lowest levels in a 
generation.   But are these problems really due to globalization?  And if so, is it possible, given 
new constraints on policy created by globalization, that little can be achieved by governments to 
redress these problems? 
  These are the issues I examine in the rest of this paper, focusing on the issues as they 
relate especially to the United States and secondarily to to Western Europe.  I focus on the 
advanced OECD economies only in the interests of manageability.  The same set of questions 
need to be thought through differently as they concern developing economies, and therefore 
deserve separate, careful attention.
1   
In section two, I start by raising the most basic question:  what is globalization?   As we 
will see, the answer is not obvious.  Of course, nobody doubts that major technical innovations 
have occurred in communications and transportation technologies.  These innovations have 
reduced the transaction costs of maintaining effective economic links on a global scale.  
Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet system eliminated this challenge to capitalist hegemony, 
even though the governments professing to Communism had long since abandoned any serious 
claim to a democratic, egalitarian alternative to free market capitalism.  The result, in any case, is 
                                                 
1 I would suggest many of the essays in the volume I co-edited with Dean Baker and Gerald Epstein, 
Globalization and Progressive Economic Policy (1998), as one reference that does address these questions 
from the standpoint of the developing economics.   3
that huge areas of the world economy were now opened to capitalism to a degree unprecedented 
in generations.   
But even given these changes, a serious literature has emerged challenging the claim that 
dramatic new departures have occurred in the patterns of global trade, investment, and finance.  I 
in turn question the conclusions of this literature, pointing to three fundamental changes in the 
patterns of global economic activity:  the rise of manufacturing capacity in developing, low-wage 
economies; the explosion of cross-border trading in all financial markets; and the fact that these 
two changes are occurring within a “big-government capitalism” institutional framework.   
  Section three then explores the implications of these three changes.  I point to three basic 
problems that have emerged in the advanced economies in association with these three new 
economic patterns, which I term “the Marx problem,” “the Keynes problem”, and “the Polanyi 
problem.”   
The Marx problem refers to the expansion of what Marx termed the “reserve army of 
labor.”  The growth of manufacturing capacity in low-wage economies means an expansion in the 
effective supply of workers capable of producing goods competitive with those produced in 
advanced economies.  As such, workers in the advanced economies lose bargaining power 
relative to capitalists.  All else equal, this should then exert downward pressure on wages in the 
advanced economies. 
  The Keynes problem is that highly liquid financial markets, such as those that have 
emerged on a global scale in our current era, are prone to bouts of speculation and instability.  
Financial instability, in turn, is frequently transmitted into the real economy, creating severe 
cyclical volatility in incomes and employment.  In addition, as the size and liquidity of financial 
markets expands, the capacity of governments to counteract such cyclical tendencies also 
weakens as the size and liquidity of financial markets expands.   
  The Polanyi problem concerns the ability of non-market forces to engender norms of 
social solidarity that can serve as effective counterweights to the competitive imperatives of a   4
free-market economy.  In large measure, big-government capitalism was built in the post World 
War II era to promote such norms of social solidarity.  However, as capitalists gain bargaining 
power in labor markets and rentiers have increasingly free rein in financia l markets, a new 
political dynamic emerges.  Workers, and the nonwealthy more generally, favor more Polanyi-
esque social protection.  But capitalists and rentiers, who favor less social protection, also enjoy 
increased political power flowing from their enhanced position in labor and financial markets.   
What makes this dynamic especially complex is that it is played out in an institutional 
environment in which big-government already exists, but its basic purposes are increasingly open 
to challenge. 
Section 4 tries to consider the relevance of these issues for understanding wage 
stagnation and the rise of earnings inequality in the contemporary United States.  I present some 
basic facts here, but these are not in dispute.  The issue, rather, is whether the pressures associated 
with globalization are responsible for these widely observed trends.  A large literature argues that 
the main cause of wage stagnation and earnings inequality is actually quite distinct from any 
pressures resulting from globalization.  According to this literature, the driving force is rather that 
the integration of computer technology into all areas of economic life has created an increased 
demand for computer-capable workers, and a corresponding decline in demand for those without 
computer skills.  This problem is termed a “skill-biased technological change.”  Drawing from the 
work of David Howell, I review the evidence in support of this perspective and find it 
unconvincing.  At the same time, the evidence remains incomplete establishing a link between 
earnings inequality and the combined pressures from globalization and the decline in egalitarian 
social norms.  Still, as I will show, the weight of evidence in support of this perspective is 
substantially more persuasive than that in behalf of the skill-biased technological change 
hypothesis. 
The implication of this last argument is that the problems associated with globalization 
are indeed real, and that new policy approaches to policy are clearly needed.  The concluding   5
section of the paper sketches an alternative policy approach.  I emphasize two main principles.  
The first is that, even while the problems we observe have fundamental global dimensions, the 
solutions will still need to be built largely within the framework of domestic policy settings.  
Following this principle, I then present some thoughts on how best to advance a domestically-
oriented egalitarian policy agenda.  This approach tries to take the full measure of the difficulties 
associated with global integration, and then explicitly seeks ways to circumvent or minimize 
these difficulties.  In my view, the viability of such a policy framework will play a major role in 
confronting the quite formidable ethical concerns resulting from globalization in its current neo-
liberal framework. 
 
2.  What is Globalization?
2 
  The evolution of capitalist economies has always been intimately bound up with nation-
states and national economic policies.  Economists have correspondingly placed the nation-state 
and national economic policy questions at the center of their analyses.  Adam Smith, for one, 
could not have been more clear that his primary concern was to understand the nature and causes 
of the wealth of nations, not merely the wealth of individuals, households, or regions. 
  The basic perception that pervades contemporary discussions about globalization is that 
the relationship between economic activity and nation states is dramatically changing.  This 
means, first, that the extent of economic interactions between people in different countries is 
simply growing, at an ever-accelerating rate:  that there is increasingly more trade, more foreign 
exchange transactions, more foreign direct investment, and more people migrating.  But in 
addition to the increase in international economic interactions, it is also widely held that 
something more fundamental is occurring:  that the quantitative increase in interactions is 
producing a qualitative change in the way nation-states operate within any given country’s 
economy.  In particular, most discussions of globalization hold that the power of nation-states to 
                                                 
2 The central argument and data in this section are drawn from Baker, Epstein and Pollin (1998).   6
influence economic activity is eroding as economies become more integrated, while the power of 
businesses and market forces is correspondingly rising.  This then enables us to provide a 
working definition to the question, “What is globalization?”  For our discussion here, it refers to 
an accelerating rate and/or higher level of economic interaction between people of different 
countries, leading to a qualitative shift in the relationship between nation-states and national 
economies.   
  Based on this definition, we then need to ask what is unique about the degree of 
economic integration in the contemporary period that sets it apart from previous historical epochs.  
Starting with a seminal paper by the late David Gordon (1988), a substantial literature has 
developed in recent years which argues that the contemporary pattern of globalization does not 
represent a significant break from patterns that operated through most of the 20
th century
3.   
  Some of the key evidence in support of this view is as follows: 
  1.  Relative to GDP, the amount and rate of increase in world trade has not changed 
significantly relative to the early part of the 20
th century, i.e. the period just before World War I. 
  2.  The extent of overall foreign direct investment has also not increased significantly 
relative to previous historical periods.  
  3.  The overwhelming share of both trade and foreign direct investment is between 
OECD countries at similar levels of development, not between countries of the wealthier “north” 
and the poor “south.” 
  4.  Net financial flows between countries, as measured, for example, by the percentage of 
total current account surpluses or deficits relative to GDP, are also currently at levels roughly 
equivalent to those during the 1920s, and are lower than those at the turn of the century. 
  Based on evidence such as this, Gordon and other authors in this stream of thought 
contend that the contemporary extent of global integration is not historically unique—which is to 
say, no qualitative break has occurred in our contemporary period in the relationship between 
                                                 
3 See also Zevin (1992), Hirst and Thompson (1996), and Sutcliffe and Glyn (1999).   7
national economies.  From this, they also argue that the difficulties that national governments face 
in dealing with the forces of globalization are similarly exaggerated. 
  The general findings advanced in behalf of this perspective are beyond dispute, and the 
researchers who have developed this evidence have certainly clarified the issues at hand.  But it 
does not follow that such evidence, by itself, provides an adequate empirical understanding of the 
nature of globalization in our current era, much less about policy constraints governments face in 
this current period.   
  In fact, crucial new developments have emerged in the current period.   Three, in 
particular, stand out:  the rise in manufacturing capacity in less developed economies; the 
exponential growth in gross financial market trading across borders and in foreign exchange 
markets; and the fact that these first two developments are occurring while the size of national 
governments, in proportion to national economies, remains quite large.  Let us consider these 
three developments in turn. 
  The Growth of Manufacturing Capacity in Developing Economies 
Beginning with Table 1A, giving data between 1970-94, we see that for the world as a 
whole, manufactures rose significantly as a share of total exports, from 60.9 percent in 1970 to 
74.7 percent in 1994.  Considering this pattern in more detail, we see that manufacturing exports 
of the developed countries rose over this period, but only modestly, from 72 percent to 79.2 
percent.  The dramatic change has taken place in the share of manufacturing exports from 
developing countries, from 18.5 percent to 66.1 percent, and in fact, this rapid increase in 
manufacturing exports from developing countries really only began after 1980.  Not surprisingly, 
by far the most rapid advances came from Asia, which saw its proportion of manufacturing 
exports explode, from 23.5 percent to 73.4 percent between only 1980-94.  However, Latin 
America and Africa have also experienced substantial, if somewhat less spectacular, increases in 
their share of manufacturing exports.   8
  We can also see in Table 1B that the contemporary rise in the proportion of 
manufacturing exports from less developed region’s is historically unprecedented.  In Asia, the 
proportion of manufacturing exports from 1913-53 was roughly comparable to that for the 1970s, 
i.e. before the dramatic increase in the regions manufacturing exports.  For Latin America and 
Asia, the proportion of manufacturing exports was generally well below that for even 1970.  For 
the industrialized economies, the rise in the proportion of manufacturing exports is substantial 
since 1913, but only negligible for the UK and Northwest Europe. 
[TABLE 1 BELONGS HERE] 
  In short, the extent of manufacturing exports coming from developing economies has 
risen to an unprecedented level.  The extent of this development becomes even more clear in 
Table 2, which presents data on manufacturing exports by region and industry between 1980-95.  
What this table shows strikingly is that the rise of manufacturing capacity in developing 
economies is not concentrated in low-technology industries, such as textiles.  Rather, developing 
economies are gaining increasing shares of export markets across all manufacturing industries, 
with the most rapid area of increase being in machinery and transportation equipment, an area 
requiring substantial technical capacity.   The overall point here is that low-wage developing 
economies are increasingly capable of producing manufactured products that are competitive on 
world markets. 
[TABLE 2 BELONGS HERE] 
The Explosion of Financial Market Trading 
  As noted above, the extent of net financial flows—i.e. net resource transfers, such as 
measured through total current account surpluses and deficits—has not changed significantly in 
the current period.  But, since the demise of Bretton Woods and the emergence of deregulated 
financial markets, there has been an enormous increase in gross flows, i.e. the total amount of 
international lending as well as secondary market trading in stock, bond, foreign exchange and 
derivative markets. Representative data on these trends is shown in Table 3.     9
TABLE 3 BELONGS HERE 
To begin with, panel 3A shows the total amount of funds raised on international financial 
markets relative to world exports from 1950-96.  For 1950, this figure was only 0.5 percent.  It 
rises to 1.8 percent by 1970, still prior to the collapse of Bretton Woods.  But post-Bretton Woods 
the ratio rises rapidly in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s.  By 1985, the ratio is 13.5 percent-
-a six-fold increase over 1970.  By 1996, the figure we report is up to 20.0 percent, showing a 
continuing dramatic rise.
4     
Panel 3B then shows more detailed breakdown of foreign transactions since 1980 in 
bonds and equities as a percentage of GDP for six OECD countries, including here both 
secondary trading as well as primary issues.  In all six cases, the jump in cross border flows from 
1980 has been spectacular--e.g. for the United States, the ratio of cross border transactions/GDP 
rose from 9 percent to 135 percent.  The largest jump was that of Italy, where the ratio rises from 
1.1 percent. 
In panel 3C we see similar patterns with growth of foreign currency trading.    Since the 
collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973, the rise in currency trading and the gross flows of financial 
assets across borders is unprecedented.  As we see, the ratio of daily foreign exchange turnover 
relative to the reserves of all central banks has risen spectacularly, from 6.8 percent of central 
bank reserves 100 percent by 1995.   
Big-Government Capitalism 
  Since the end of World War II, governments have played a central role in the advanced 
capitalist economies to promote macroeconomic stability, finance social welfare programs, and 
subsidize favored industries (including, in the United States, the weapons industry).  This 
represents a dramatic change in the role of government relative to the pre World War II era.  The 
                                                 
4 But even this 20.0 figure for 1996 is a conservative estimate, in that, for purposes of comparability across 
the full period, we exclude the category “uncommitted facilities”, as reported by the OECD for this year.  
Had we included these “uncommitted” as well as the “committed facilities” in our total for funds raised, the 
ratio of funds raised/exports for 1996 would be 30.0 percent.    10
extent of this change can be seen in Table 4, showing total government expenditures as a share of 
GDP for six representative OECD countries between 1880-1996.  This ratio rises from 10.0 
percent in 1880 to 11.7 percent in 1913 to 45.7 percent in 1992, before falling slightly as of 1996, 
to 45.1 percent.
5 
TABLE 4 BELONGS HERE 
3.  Fundamental Problems due to Globalization 
  What are the implications of these developments for understanding the current epoch of 
globalization?  This is the issue to which we now turn. 
  The three unique features of our contemporary epoch of globalization—the rise in 
manufacturing capacity in the developing economies, the explosive growth of financial market 
trading, and the fact that these changes have emerged within an institutional framework of big 
government capitalism—have, in turn, engendered three basic problems, which I have termed the 
Marx, Keynes and Polanyi problems.  In associating these problems with major thinkers whose 
work all greatly antedates our contemporary epoch of globalization, I am also trying to emphasize 
that the problems of contemporary globally integrated capitalism are by no means new or unique.  
What is unique is just how these long-standing problems have become manifested in our current 
period. 
The Marx Problem 
  The basic issue here is the expansion of what Marx termed the “reserve army of 
unemployed.”  Marx argued that, in general, workers have less bargaining power than capitalists 
in labor markets because they do not own their own means of production.  But Marx also stressed 
that workers bargaining strength diminishes further when unemployment is high, since that means 
the employed workers can be readily replaced by the reserve army of unemployed  outside the 
factory gates.   
                                                 
5 These differences over time would be greater still if we considered non-military expenditures only.  Due 
to data inadequacies, we have thus far  been unable to decompose the figures to that degree.     11
  In terms of the contemporary global setting, the dynamics of the reserve army effect in 
high-wage economies such as the United States changes when firms operating in low-wage 
economies can produce export-competitive manufactured products.   In this situation, the 
potential size of the reserve army necessarily expands to also include both the unemployed and, 
even more to the point, employed but low-paid workers in the developing economies.  As such, 
the capitalists in the advanced economies have gained an additional bargaining advantage in 
wage-setting negotiations.  This is because firms can now credibly claim that their own relatively 
high labor costs will threaten their export markets and increase import competition from low-
wage competitors.  In addition, the firms in high-wage economies whose operations are not tied 
to a specific location can credibly threaten to move to low-wage economies if costs in their 
current locations appear too high.   The crucial issue here is not that firms actually leave their 
existing high-wage location but that they can brandish a credible threat to exit. 
6 
  In terms of the contemporary U.S. economy, this shift in bargaining power has been 
widely recognized, even if difficult to measure directly.  For example, even amid the lowest 
unemployment rates in a generation, Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan referred in his July 
1997 semi-annual Congressional testimony to “a heightened sense of job insecurity,” among U.S. 
workers and “as a consequence, subdued wages.”
7  This view is also reflected in the results of a 
Business Week poll reported in its 12/27/99 issue.  Considering what Business Week termed the 
current "productivity boom," 63 percent said that the "boom" has not raised their earned income, 
and 62 percent felt that it had not raised their job security. These negative attitudes by U.S. 
workers are especially remarkable, given that the media has persistently portrayed the Clinton 
economy as a period of near-universal prosperity. 
The Keynes Problem 
                                                 
6 This same point is developed, if from a different analytic framework, in Rodrik (1997) and, through a 
game-theoretic model, in  Rodrik and van Ypersele (1999). 
7 The Greenspan testimony can be found at 
http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/hh/1997/july/testimony.htm, on the Federal Reserve web site.   12
  Investors in capitalist economies are faced with the unavoidable problem of uncertainty: 
forecasts and projections aside, “we simply do not know”, as Keynes put it, how profitable a 
prospective investment project will be.  A primary purpose of financial markets is to ameliorate 
problems due to uncertainty through increasing the liquidity of investments.  When financial 
instruments are freely traded in relatively thick markets, illiquid investments in plant and 
equipment can be transformed into claims that are convertible into cash or other liquid assets as 
quickly as the institutional and technological structures permit. 
  However, enhancing the liquidity of assets also tends to create serious problems for the 
stability of capitalist economies.  One problem is the phenomenon described by Keynes of market 
participants focusing their energies on outguessing the market rather than understanding the long-
term productive capacities of firms.  This phenomenon is, in turn, a basic factor generating the 
persistent problem of instability associated with liquid financial markets. Because markets 
operate on the basis of ephemeral information, they are liable to function as a herd.  The 
destructive effects of financial market herd behavior are not hard to find:  the 1997-98 Asian 
crisis, the 1995 Mexican crisis, and the U.S. Savings and Loan crisis of the early 1990s are only 
some recent dramatic examples.
 8    
  In addition, excessively liquid financial markets weaken the standard tools of 
macroeconomic stabilization and expansion.  As Minsky (1986) argued, standard fiscal and 
monetary policy tools cannot bring the economy to a full employment equilibrium when financial 
markets are highly speculative.  Depending on the specific circumstances, including those in the 
nonfinancial economy, full employment will rather promote either euphoric expectations among 
                                                 
8 Kindleberger (1978) , discusses the problem of financial instability over a 250-year history of Western 
capitalism between 1720-1975, developing his analytic framework from Hyman Minsky’s Keynesian 
theory of endogenous financial fragility. But we need to recognize here that it doesn’t necessarily follow 
that more liquid financial markets are necessarily more volatile.  Indeed, all else equal, thicker markets 
would tend to be more stable than thin markets.  This is because, if all else were equal, a greater diversity 
of opinions would prevail in thick markets, thus increasing the likelihood that market optimists and 
pessimists would counterbalance one another.  The reality, however, is that all else is not equal.  Rather, by 
their nature, actual thick financial markets  generate uncertainty and herd behavior rather than a diversity of 
perspectives.     13
those investors who would benefit from a boom, such as real estate developers; or unfavorable 
expectations among investors whose fixed-income securities would lose value in an inflationary 
environment.   As a result, policymakers must then respond to the expectations of these investors 
rather than the underlying conditions of the nonfinancial economy.  This is the problem Alan 
Greenspan has been confronting in recent years in the U.S. in his futile efforts at talking down a 
stock market driven by what he terms “irrational exuberance.”   
  Furthermore, once a financial crisis has broken out and governments must try to 
neutralize a stampeding financial herd, their capacity intervene effectively will be smaller when 
the size of the stampede is relatively large.  The logic of this is clear in the case of contemporary 
foreign exchange markets.   Precisely because daily trading on these markets has risen from 6.8 
percent of central banks' foreign currency reserves in 1977 to over 100 percent today, central 
banks have far less capacity to serve as a market-maker to counteract speculative stampedes.   
The  Polanyi Problem 
  The period in which big government capitalism was built was the aftermath of the 1930s 
Depression, World War II, and the developing worldwide competition with Communist 
governments. In this context, Karl Polanyi made a forceful case in his classic work The Great 
Transformation (1944) that for market economies to function with some modicum of fairness, 
they must be embedded in social institutions that effectively promote broadly accepted notions of 
the common good.   
  Various social democratic movements within the advanced economies adapted the 
Polanyi perspective.  They argued in favor of government macroeconomic interventions to 
achieve three basic ends:  stabilizing aggregate demand at some reasonable approximation of full 
employment; creating a financial market environment that is stable and conducive to the efficient 
allocation of investment funds; and distributing equitably the rewards from high employment, 
macroeconomnic stability and efficiency in investment allocations.  The political ascendancy of   14
these ideas were the basis for the dramatic increase that we have observed in the government 
expenditure/GDP ratio. 
  But the implementation of a social democratic capitalism was never a consensus position.  
Many sectors of capital opposed efforts to sustain full employment because, as we have seen, full 
employment engenders greater bargaining power for workers in labor markets, even while it also  
increases the economy’s total output of goods and services.
9  Greater worker bargaining power 
can also create inflationary pressures, and inflation will, in turn, depreciate the value of rentiers’ 
portfolio of assets with nominally fixed values.  In addition, market-inhibiting financial 
regulations limit the capacity of rentiers to both diversify risk and speculate. 
  Hence, it should not be surprising that capitalists and rentiers would utilize their 
increased bargaining power in labor and financial markets to also change the direction of 
government policy in behalf of their own ends.  The issue here, moreover, is not deregulation of 
markets per se.  Rather it is that markets be deregulated to support the interests of capitalists and 
rentiers, even as these same groups still benefit greatly from many forms of government support, 
including investment subsidies, tax concessions, and central bank rescue operations during 
financial crises.  At the same time, the deregulation of markets that favors capitalists and rentiers 
is correspondingly the most powerful regulatory mechanism limiting the demands of workers, in 
that deregulation has been congruent with the worldwide expansion of the reserve army of labor 
and the declining capacity of national governments to implement full-employment 
macroeconomic policies.     
  This confluence of developments constitutes a unique historical juncture, since the 
apparatus of big government capitalism is still largely in place even while its purposes have come 
increasingly under challenge.  To illustrate this dynamic, it will be helpful to briefly examine a 
highly insightful model developed by Elissa Braunstein and Gerald Epstein (1999).  Consistent 
with recent work by Rodrik (1997), Braunstein and Epstein first argue that a positive correlation 
                                                 
9 The classic statement of this problem is by Kalecki (1971).   15
exists between the degree of openness of in the advanced capitalist economies and the demands 
of the nonwealthy in these economies for various forms of social protection.  In Figure 1, we 
portray this relationship as an upward sloping demand curve for social protection, as a function of 
the economy’s degree of openness. 
At the same time, Braunstein and Epstein also argue that the supply of social protection is 
a negative function of openness.  This downward sloping curve in Figure 1 captures the basic 
political scenario described above.  That is, first, capitalists and rentiers have gained increased 
bargaining power in labor and financial markets in the current era of neoliberal globalization.  
They have then also transformed this increased market power to increased political power, 
enabling them to pay lower taxes and operate with fewer regulations.   
FIGURE 1 BELONGS HERE 
At point  O1 in the diagram, the economy is in equilibrium.  However, as openness 
increases to O2, a disequilibriium emerges between the increasing demand and decreasing supply 
of social protection.  The fundamental problem from the standpoint of state policy is how this 
disequilibrium gets resolved.  Figure 2 sketches two alternative possibilities.  The “Polanyi 
solution” would be for social protection to increase—i.e. a movement up the demand curve and a 
shift out in the supply curve.  This generates an increase in social protection from P1 to P2.  
However, the solution that has dominated politics in the advanced economies is a neoliberal 
solution, i.e. a movement down the supply curve with a shift out in the demand curve.  This 
means that workers are forced to accept a lower level of social protection as the economy 
becomes more open, as we see in the movement downward from point P1 to P2 in panel B.     
FIGURE 2 BELONGS HERE 
The most influential expression of this neoliberal solution is the ascendancy of the 
arguments for “labor market flexibility” as the cure for persistent mass unemployment in Europe.  
As the term is used, a “flexible labor market” is one in which legal and institutional barriers to 
hiring and firing workers are minimized, so that workers “reservation wage”—the lowest wage at   16
which a worker is willing to accept a job—falls.  Proponents of this approach say that high 
unemployment rates in Europe are due to inflexible labor markets and that, correspondingly, the 
flexibility of U.S. labor markets explains our far lower unemployment rate.  Many labor market 
regulations, no doubt, are outdated and counterproductive.  But the basic meaning of labor market 
flexibility as currently proposed within the neoliberal framework entails that workers in high-
wage economies relinquish the gains they have won over the previous two generations, in terms 
of living standards, safety, and job security.  Thus, the call for labor market flexibility as the 
foundation of an approach to employment policies conforms exactly to the neoliberal solution to 
disequilibrium portrayed in Figure 1.  
4.  Globalization and Inequality in the United States 
The United States has indeed experienced far lower unemployment rates than the 
European economies over the past 20 years, and especially during the low unemployment years 
during the Clinton presidency.  But, as claims about the virtues of labor market flexibility itself 
fully recognize, it does not follow from achieving low unemployment rates alone that conditions 
for working people and the poor will improve.  Rather, as the summary figures presented in Table 
5 convey, what has been remarkable especially about the economic boom under the Clinton 
presidency is really how little the non-wealthy have shared in its benefits.  This then provides 
some objective confirmation for the impressions cited earlier by Alan Greenspan and the 
Business Week poll about the persistent insecurity of U.S. workers.   
  We see in Table 5, to begin with, that unemployment has fallen on average relative to 
both the Carter and Reagan-Bush periods.  But the average unemployment rate under Clinton, at 
5.8 percent through 1998, is still only equal to the level of the Nixon-Ford era and well below the 
4.8 percent average attained under Kennedy and Johnson.
10 
                                                 
10   The table includes figures only through 1998 since data for 1999 are still not available for all of the 
indicators in the table.  However, figures are now available for the U.S. unemployment rate for 1999, which 
was 4.2 percent.  Adding that year to the Clinton total improves its average performance for 1993-99 to 5.6.  
The unemployment figures for 2000 will almost definitely produce another year of favorable results,   17
  But even with this relatively favorable employment performance under Clinton, we still 
see that both average wages for nonsupervisory workers and wages for those in the 10 percent 
decile of the wage distribution remain well below those during the Nixon/Ford and Carter 
administrations, and are even lower than those during the Reagan/Bush years.  In addition, as 
measured by the ratio of 90
th/10
th percent decile wages, we see that wage inequality has increased 
sharply during Clinton's tenure in office, even relative to the Reagan/Bush years. 
  Finally, there has been essentially no reduction in poverty under Clinton, relative even to 
the Reagan/Bush years, during which governmental anti-poverty efforts were sharply curtailed. 
Even if low unemployment rates are sustained through the end of Clinton's term in 2000, the 
poverty figures under Clinton may still worsen in his final years in office, as the dismantling of 
the federal welfare program becomes more fully implemented.   
TABLE 5 BELONGS HERE 
Alternative Explanations for Observed Trends 
  Of course, the fact of rising earnings inequality in the United States does not, by itself, 
provide any explanation about the causes of inequality.  Indeed, the prevailing explanation does 
not refer at all to globalization, much less changes in relative bargaining power among workers, 
capitalists and rentiers.  Rather, what has been termed a “skill-biased technological change” is 
seen by the majority of observers as the primary explanation for the observed trends.  According 
to this view, the rapid integration of computer technology into all areas of economic life has 
created an increased demand for workers who are capable of operating effectively with 
computers.  Demand has correspondingly fallen for workers without computer skills.  This 
relative shift in demand for the computer-skilled versus the unskilled has, in turn, increased the 
relative wage differential between those with and without computer skills.  Summarizing this 
                                                                                                                                                 
improving still further the overall figure for the Clinton presidency, perhaps to a final average of around 5.4 
percent.   Nevertheless, even allowing for impressive unemployment figures for 1999 and 2000, we see that 
the Clinton performance still will not match that during the Kennedy/Johnson era.   
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perspective in his characteristically confident tone, Paul Krugman (1994) writes that “the growth 
in earnings inequality…has been the result of technological changes that just happen to work 
against unskilled workers.” 
  However, as David Howell shows in a brilliant paper (1999), the evidence which 
supports this predominant explanation of rising U.S. inequality is remarkably flimsy, if not 
altogether illusory.  Consider the following passage from Howell, just one example of his 
dissection of this literature:   
In one of the most widely cited papers on the growth in skill intensity, 
Berman Bound, and Griliches (1994) report that the nonproduction to production 
worker ratio increased from 30.9 percent in 1979 to 35.4 percent in 1987….The 
authors interpret these trends as evidence that the manufacturing sector 
experienced substantial skill upgrading over this decade, and conclude that 
“biased technological change is an important part of the explanation.”   
However, the annual data show that the entire increase took place 
between 1980 and 1982; between 1983 and the early 1990s the ratio remained 
essentially unchanged.  With a similar measure for the entire private, nonfarm 
economy, a pronounced long-term upward trend is evident from 1948 through 
1982, after which the nonproduction share actually begins to decline.  The timing 
of these changes in “skill composition” would seem to pose a major problem for 
the technology story since computerization does not begin to take off until just 
about the same time that the stability (or decline) in the skill measure sets in in 
the mid-1980s.  At the same time, much of the decline in the wages of those at 
the bottom of the wage distribution between the late 1960s and the mid-1990s 
occurs between 1979 and 1983—again, before computerization could have 
produced the wholesale restructuring of the workplace that is presumed by the 
skill-biased technology explanation.  (pp. 64-65). 
 
  Howell also cites a range of case-study evidence which shows that increased 
computerization of production has by no means consistently increased the relative demand for 
skilled workers.  In many cases, such as with automated supermarket checkout technologies and 
numerical controls in machine shops, computerization has engendered a downgrading rather than 
an upgrading in the skill demands of a given job.  Howell shows how such case-study evidence 
contrary to the skill-biased technology perspective has been either ignored by proponents of this 
view or even, in some cases, inaccurately interpreted to support, rather than contradict,  their 
perspective.   19
  Contrary to the predominant view, Howell advances a view of rising earnings inequality 
in the U.S. consistent with the broader perspective advanced here about the effects of 
globalization.  He writes 
Increasing trade and capital flows between the United States and low-wage and 
high-wage nations alike made low-skill workers throughout the world far more 
easily substitutable with one another, which means that the demand for U.S. 
labor became more elastic—more responsive to changes in its costs—which in 
turn would tend to reduce worker bargaining power.  (p. 77) 
 
  As Howell himself recognizes, the empirical support for this alternative view is 
itself still far from complete.   Part of the problem is that it is inherently difficult to 
quantify shifts in bargaining power, especially since what one needs to capture is how 
credible, and therefore powerful, are the threats brandished by business firms in 
negotiations with workers, rather than just the observable outcome of these negotiations.  
Nevertheless, a growing body of persuasive evidence in behalf of this perspective is 
emerging, considering the issue from a variety of angles. 
  Svejnar (1986) has done the most extensive general study of the impact of threats 
on bargaining power.  His key result is that exogenous changes in the negotiating 
environment—such as, in our case, an increase in openness—can be shown empirically to 
affect the relative bargaining power of firms and workers.  For example, Svejnar shows 
that the imposition of wage and price controls negatively affected workers’ bargaining 
power in wage negotiations. 
  Bronfenbrenner (1996) has conducted the most directly relevant study of how 
threat effects per se have influenced labor negotiations.  She reports the results of a 
survey between 1993-95, which showed that 50 percent of all firms and 65 percent of 
manufacturing firms that were targets of union organizing campaigns threatened to close 
their shops and relocate if the workers voted to unionize.  Though only 12 percent of 
those firms that ended up unionized did then carry through on their threat to relocate, 
workers nevertheless found the threats credible.  In particular, in cases where firms did   20
make threats to shutdown or relocate, unions lost a significantly larger percentage of 
elections.
11   
  Addressing the issue from another angle, Fortin and Lemieux (1997) tested the 
extent to which “quantifiable measures of institutional forces” can explain the rise of U.S. 
earnings inequality.  They conclude that about one-third of the growth of inequality in the 
1980s can be attributed to changes in three such forces:  the real value of the minimum 
wage, the unionization rate, and economic deregulation.  They also make clear that their 
model did not attempt to measure the effects of  “cultural or social norms that may play 
an important role in wage determination, but are difficult to quantify.”  One should also 
note that the patterns that prevailed for these three forces in the 1980s—i.e. historically 
low minimum wages and unionization rates and a deregulated legal environment—did of 
course persist throughout the 1990s.   
  Finally, in the analogous situation of negotiations between corporations and 
governments, it has been widely documented that corporate tax rates have fallen as 
economies have become more open.  For example, using data for 18 OECD countries, 
Rodrik (1997) finds that capital tax rates fall and labor tax rates rise as trade openness 
increases.
12 
5.  Global and Domestic Policy Approaches 
   The Marx,  Keynes and Polanyi problems associated with the contemporary epoch of 
globalization help us to understand the political force behind the ascendancy of neliberal policies.  
                                                 
11 Bronfenbrenner writes, “The union election win rate was lower in units where plant closing threats 
occurred (33 percent) compared to the overall win rate of 40 percent, and the difference was larger where 
the threats were put in writing (25 percent win rate for direct written threats, 37 percent for veiled written 
threats).”  In addition, she reports that “30 percent of the organizers in the withdrawl cases (where 
unionization attempts were withdrawn) and more than half of the organizers in withdrawl cases where 
threats occurred, reported that threats of plant closings contributed to the union withdrawing the petition 
before the campaign went to an election,” (p. 14-15). 
12 See also similar findings as concerned capital mobility as opposed to trade openness in Tanzi (1993) and 
Avi-Yonah (1998).   21
But does it follow that neoliberal globalization is inevitable—that, as Margeret Thatcher put it, 
“there is no alternative” to a neoliberal global order? 
  Recognizing that the Marx, Keynes and Polanyi problems are real and serious does not 
imply that they impose insuperable obstacles to progressive alternatives to neoliberalism.  Quite 
the contrary:  Taking the full measure of the difficulties they impose is actually the first step 
toward  advancing a viable alternative agenda.  The intellectual challenge is therefore to think 
through a new egalitarian policy approach that is able to transcend the real constraints imposed by 
neoliberal globalization.  Of course, such an intellectual effort is by no means either independent 
of, or alternative to, the political project of building support for such policies.  But while it is 
obvious that a successful political alternative will not emerge in the absence of a political 
movement to fight for it, it is equally true, if less obvious, that such a political movement will 
dissipate its well-intentioned energy unless it possesses some clarity and specifics as to what its 
policy agenda should be.   
  Given that the problems at hand are global, it is perhaps inevitable that we begin thinking 
about solutions in global terms as well, for example, of new policy institutions that would 
promote international policy coordination.  Such thinking is at the heart of several proposals, such 
as the plan of John Eatwell and Lance Taylor (2000) for a new Global Financial Authority whose 
primary purpose would be to regulate and stabilize financial markets, and thus  create space for 
national governments to coordinate employment-expanding macroeconomic policies.  Such 
proposals certainly have merit on their own terms.  However, the reliance on international 
cooperation as the leading edge of an alternative progressive policy agenda also has serious flaws: 
  1.  The failings of the existing policy framework are by no means due to a lack of 
institutions and policies supporting global economic cooperation.  The IMF, World Bank, and 
WTO already exist and they do operate on the basis of international cooperation.  The problem, of 
course, is not international cooperation per se, but that these institutions promote cooperation in 
behalf of neo-liberalism.  The need, therefore, is not to simply create another such transnational   22
institution, but to build a viable international constituency for a progressive alternative to neo-
liberalism. 
  2.  The only conditions under which these types of cooperative relationships could form 
would be through progressive national governments that are attempting to implement egalitarian 
macroeconomic and labor market policies within their domestic economies.  But such 
governments are not likely to form if they require an environment of global cooperation as a 
precondition to attempting a domestic progressive agenda.  Rather, such governments will need to 
demonstrate some success with their domestic policy agendas before they acquire the credibility 
to push for international cooperation.  In other words, successful domestic policy initiatives are  
the prerequisite needed to transform any proposals for an international egalitarian agenda into a 
realistic possibility.  But here we face a Catch 22: if the governments mandated to advance an 
egalitarian growth agenda are doomed to failure because of global constraints, then it is also 
certain that the cooperative international policy agenda will remain thwarted.   
 What is clearly needed therefore is set of domestic policies that can limit the force of 
existing external constraints and thereby also create the conditions in which desirable forms of 
international cooperation become possible.  But is it constructive to even think about domestic 
oriented policies that would be broadly applicable given the current degree of global integration?  
Of course, there are huge structural differences between countries, even those at similar levels of 
development.  As such, there is no reason that the specifics that would be relevant to one country 
under a given situation can be generalized beyond that time and place.  However, some basic 
propositions as to the most effective ways to sustain a domestic egalitarian policy path should 
have broad applicability.  Indeed, my own thinking on this question began to form in the early 
1990s as I was working on two separate macroeconomic policy projects, one for the United States 
and the other for Bolivia.     23
With this in mind, I can point to three crucial areas in which an egalitarian domestic 
policy alternative to neoliberal globalization can make important advances
13:   
1.  Full-employment macroeconomic policies that, to the greatest possible degree, 
minimize the “leakages” and financial pressures that result from globalization, including import 
leakages, as well as pressures on exchange and interest rates; 
2.  New financial regulatory policies that both create domestic “circuit breakers” against 
speculative financial markets and also allocates credit toward investments yielding high social 
rates of return; and  
3.  Labor market and welfare state policies that channel a fair share of the benefits of 
employment growth, relative financial stability and egalitarian credit allocation priorities to 
working people and the poor.  Such policies could also promote wage bargaining systems that 
minimize the inflationary pressures associated with full employment. 
If domestically oriented policies of this sort can be put in place and succeed, two other 
important outcomes would follow.  First, the costs to working people of trade openness would fall 
sharply, since with full employment and a generous system of social protection, the efficiency 
gains from trade would not be borne on the backs of workers.  Returning to the logic of our 
diagram in Figure 1, this policy framework would promote the Polanyi solution to the opening of 
global trade.  If one is concerned with social welfare outcomes, it therefore does not follow that 
trade openness must logically be packaged with a regime of  financial deregulation and “labor 
market flexibility” as the cure for unemployment.   
In addition to this, successful domestic policy initiatives will then create the space in 
which demands for international coordination in behalf of an egalitarian policy  agenda—not 
simply international coordination per se—will gather legitimacy and force.  There are alternatives 
to neoliberal globalization.  But they will have to be developed fundamentally at the ground level 
                                                 
13 I consider each of these policy areas at some length in Pollin (1998).   24
of domestic politics before they will have solid footing within the citadels of global economic 
policymaking.         25
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 TABLE 1.  Manufacturing Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports  
 




1970  1980  1990  1994 
World 
 




72.0 70.2 78.0 79.2 
Eastern Europe  
 
59.1 50.2 43.9 53.0 
Developing Countries 
 
18.5 17.7 54.3 66.1 
     Asia 
 
22.4 23.5 65.5 73.4 
     Latin America 
 
10.6 14.7 30.8 48.7 
     Africa  
 
7.0 4.0 15.1  17.8 
 
 
1B:  1913-1953 Period 
 
  1913 
 
1928  1937  1953 
U.S. and Canada 
 
25.8 38.5 44.7 60.7 
United Kingdom 
 




52.0 65.0 63.1 57.3 
Asia, excluding 
China and N. 
Korea 
 
21.2 30.9 28.1 25.3 
Latin America 
 
3.2 2.1 1.7 2.3 
Africa  3.7 2.5 3.7 8.5 
 
 
Sources:  World Employment Report 1995, ILO, p. 33 for 1970-90; UN Handbook of 
International Trade and Development Statistics 1995, Tables A.1 and A.13 for 1994; P. 
Lamartine Yates, Forty Years of Foreign Trade, New York: Macmillan, 1959, p. 55 for 
1913-55. TABLE 2.  Shares of World Manufacturing Exports by Region and 
Industry, 1980-95 
(in percentages of world exports) 




































34.0  53.8 7.8  16.4 5.8  22.0 14.9 23.4 17.2 26.8 





2.3  3.0 2.0 2.6 1.0 2.9 5.0 7.6 1.5 2.9 
Africa 
 
1.5  1.9 0.9 1.1 0.1 0.2 3.8 2.7 1.5 2.9 
Asia 
 
30.1  48.9 4.8  12.6 4.6  18.9 6.0  13.1 10.0 22.3 
 
Source:  UN World Economic and Social Survey, 1997, p. 248, Table A.17. 
 
 TABLE 3.  The Growth of Financial Market Transactions 
 
6A)  Funds Raised on International Financial Markets as Percentage of World 
Exports 
 
1950  1960  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1996 
 




3B)  Cross-Border Transactions in Bonds and Equities as Percentage of GDP 
 




9.0  35.1 89.0 135.5 
Japan 
 
7.7 63.0  120.0  65.7 
Germany 
 
7.5  33.4 57.3 168.3 
France 
 
----- 21.4 53.6 178.2 
Italy 
 
1.1 4.0 26.6  250.9 
 
Canada  9.6  26.7 64.4 192.0 
 
 
3C)  Daily Foreign Exchange Markets Turnover as Percent of Total Central Bank 
Reserves 
 



















Sources:   
Table 3A:  OECD International Capital Market Statistics; A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 
1820-1992; IMF World Economic Outlook, October 1996; For 1996, exports from World Trade 
Organization Annual Report 1997, Table A.3; Funds Raised on Capital Markets, OECD Financial Market 
Trends, February 1998, Table 1.   
Table 3B:  BIS, 66th Annual Report, p. 98, and 67
th Annual Report, p. 119. 
Table 3C:  Felix (1998) 
Note on Table 3A: The 1996 figure for “funds raised on international financial markets” includes only 
“committed facilities”, i.e. excludes “uncommitted facilities,” which maintains consistency with the figures 
for 1950-90. 
 TABLE 4.  Total Government Expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
 
  1880  1913  1938  1950  1973  1992 
 
1996 





10.0 17.7 42.4 30.4 42.0 46.1 49.7 
Japan 
 
9.0  14.2 30.3 19.8 22.9 33.5 36.6 
Netherlands 
 
na  8.2  21.7 26.8 45.5 54.1 50.9 
United 
Kingdom 






na  8.0  19.8 21.4 31.1 38.5 36.7 
AVERAGE  10.0 
 





Source:  A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, Table 3-5, pp. 65.  For 1996, 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, March 1998. 
 Table 5.  Measures of well-being for workers and the poor 
Performance by Presidential Periods 
 










































for 10th percent 
decile 

















































Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt (1999). 
Notes:  Wage data for decile groupings begins in 1973. 
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